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PUBLIC UTILITIES: THE FUEL
ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE IN MISSOURI
In light of rapidly rising fuel costs, public utilities' have sought
financial relief from federal and state regulatory commissions in or-
der to reconcile the demands of a fluctuating economy with fixed-rate
schedules.2 Commission approval of fuel adjustment clauses' in re-
1. Public utilities are industries that possess certain economic characteristics indi-
cating a need for administrative, as opposed to market, regulation. C. PHILLIPS, THE
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 78 (rev. ed. 1969). A business connected with transpor-
tation or distribution, operating under an obligation to afford its facilities to the pub-
lic generally, upon demand, or enjoying freedom from competition due to monopoly
status or state license exhibits some of the needed characteristics. Id.
The term "public utility," when used in this chapter, includes every common
carrier, pipeline corporation, gas corporation, electric corporation, telephone cor-
poration, telegraph corporation, water corporation, heat or refrigerating corpora-
tion, and sewer corporation, as these terms are defined in this section, and each
thereof is hereby declared to be a public utility and to be subject to the jurisdic-
tion, control and regulation of the commission and to the provisions of this chap-
ter.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 386.020(25) (1978).
The term "electrical corporation," when used in this chapter, includes every
corporation, company association, joint stock company or association, partner-
ship or person, their lessees, trustees or receivers appointed by any court whatso-
ever, .. . controlling or managing any electric plant except where electricity is
generated or distributed by the producer solely on or through private property
for railroad or street railroad purposes or for its own use or the use of its tenants
and not for sale to others.
Id. § 386.020(13) (1978).
2. See Trigg, Escalator Clauses in Public Utility Rate Schedules, 106 U. PA. L.
REV. 964, 964 (1958). Following the oil embargo in 1973 the cost of fuel rose 86.8% in
a year, leading to widespread use of fuel adjustment clauses. See HOUSE SUBCOMM.
ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN CoM., ELEC-
TRIC UTILITY AUTOMATIC FUEL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSES, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1975) [hereinafter cited as OVERSIGHT REPORT]. Natural gas prices rose 41%, coal
prices 42%, and oil prices 140%. .d. at 33.
3. "A fuel adjustment clause is a clause, filed as a part of an electric utility's tariff,
which allows it to automatically increase or decrease the charge for power per kilo-
watt-hour to consumers by the amount of an increase or decrease in the utility's fuel
costs, usually on a monthly basis." State ex rel Utility Consumers Council v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 585 S.W.2d 41, 44 (Mo. 1979).
The fuel clause works as follows: When the price of fuel per unit increases or
decreases a certain amount above or below the base price, the company passes the
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sponse to recent inflation has prompted considerable consumer out-
rage and increasing litigation4 on the scope of agency power and
discretion. In State ex rel Utility Consumers Council v. Public Service
Commission,' the Missouri Supreme Court held that authorization of
a fuel adjustment clause by the state's public service commission ex-
ceeded its statutory authority.
The Missouri Public Service Commission issued a report and order
in 19766 modifying and extending a 19747 electric utility fuel adjust-
cost on to the consumer. To illustrate: "The Lnergy charge will be increased or de-
creased at the rate of 0.156 mill per kilowatt-hour for each 25 cent increase or de-
crease in the price of coal above or below the base price of $5 per ton." C. PHILLIPS,
supra note 1, at 352 n.6.
lain adjustment clause usually takes the form of a fixed rule, determined to be
just and reasonable in the underlying rate proceeding, accompanied, at least by
implication, with the finding that it does not become less so by reason of its
provision for subsequent changes in rates upward or downward, based on the
occurrence of future events. In a word, adjustment clauses are notper se illegal.
Carver, Developments in Regulation: Adjtqstment Clauses, 53 DEN. L.J. 663, 669, 669-
70 nn.34-38 (1976).
4. See Electric Utility Problems: Fuel Adjustment Clauses, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Oversight Hear-
ings] (testimony of Ralph H. Wickberg).
One commentator credits the furor over fuel adjustment clauses to the fact they
pass on fuel cost increases exactly as intended. The fuel cost increase is a conspicuous
addition to the consumer's bill. See Schiffel, Electric Utility Regulation: An Overview
of FuelAdjustment Clauses, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 19, 1975, at 27. But see The Fuel
Adjustment Caper, 39 CONSUMER REPORTS 836 (1974) for reports of abuse of fuel
clauses by utilities.
Utility spokesmen credit fuel adjustment clauses with preserving the industry's
financial integrity and preventing bankruptcy during 1973-1974. See Oversight Hear-
ings, supra at 5 (testimony of Ralph H. Wickberg); id. at 718 (statement of Steven C.
Griffith).
5. 585 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1979), rehearing denied, Sept. 11, 1979.
6. In re Investigation of the Fuel Adjustment Method for the Recovery of Fuel
Costs by Elec. Util. Operating in the State of Mo., Report and Order, Case No. 17,730
(Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n April 14, 1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Report & Order].
The commission prescribed a model fuel adjustment clause for all the electrical utili-
ties in Missouri. The order set out fuel costs to use in implementing the formula, the
Federal Power Commission expense account to employ, and which energy sales to
enter into it. The order also provided for a surcharge to collect revenues still due
under a 1974 order, for the inclusion of the incremental increases or decreases since
1974 (a roll-in of fuel costs) in the base rate; for an auditing of the roll-in procedures
and subsequent fuel adjustment charges; and for the filing with the commission of all
new coal contracts and any renewed or renegotiated coal contracts. The commission
based the 1974 clause on the increase or decrease of cost per million BTU's of fossil
fuel burned, weighted in relation to kilowatt hours generated or purchased. It in-
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ment clause for residential and commercial users.8 The commission
found that delay caused by regulatory lag9 forced utilities to absorb
higher fuel costs without receiving compensating revenues, creating
cluded a requirement of 30 days' notice to the commission before adjustments. In re
Investigation of the Fuel Adjustment Method for the Recovery of Fuel Costs by Elec.
Util. Operating in the State of Mo., Report and Order, Case No. 17,730 (Mo. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n Feb. 1, 1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Report & Order]. The 1976
clause was more specific. The fuel adjustment would be determined through a model
formula. The fuel adjustment factor for a month would be determined from the total
cost of fuel used in the billing period two months earlier. The commission excluded
fuel costs for oil and hydro-electric power purchased from other companies and fuel
costs for power sold to other in-state and out-of-state firms. Other fuel costs for
purchased power were included. The company would then divide these costs by the
total estimated sales in the billing period. A correction factor would compensate con-
sumers for payments made when the estimated sales differed from actual sales. 1976
Report & Order at Appendices A & B.
7. See 1974 Report & Order, srpra note 6. The order proposes a model fuel ad-
justment clause and requires a review of its operation after two years.
8. Fuel adjustment clauses have been part of Missouri utilities' rate schedules for
industrial and large commercial users since as early as 1918. Union Elec. Light and
Power Co., 1918E PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 490 (Mo.). That matter was not before the
court in State ex rel. Utility Consumers Council v. Public Serv. Comm'n, so there is still
a limited fuel adjustment clause in Missouri. 585 S.W.2d 41, 44 (Mo. 1979).
During the hearings, a Public Service Commission official stated that residential
users were originally excluded from the fuel adjustment clause because the margin
between the cost of producing electricity and the price paid was smaller for industrial
users than for residential users. The clause serves to preserve that margin above cost
to industry users. Hearings: In re Investigation of the FuelAdjustment Methodfor the
Recovery f Fuel Costs by Elec. Util Operating in the State a/Mo., Case No. 17,730 at
331 (1973) (prepared testimony of Gordon L. Persinger).
Escalation of industrial rates without escalation of residential rates is not discrimi-
natory; the industrial user pays only the increased cost of fuel burned in generating
electricity used by him and not the increased cost attributable to residential use. Util-
ity companies formerly absorbed residential cost increases rather than incurring the
expense of billing small surcharges. Increased efficiency in billing, however, led many
utilities to include the fuel adjustment in residential rates. Trigg, supra note 2, at 976.
9. Rate cases now last an average of ten and a half months from start to finish.
See OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 2, at 12. Such delays, quite common in regu-
lated industries, create difficulty in maintaining just and reasonable rates. Re Lynch-
burg Gas Co., 6 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 33 (Va. 1954). During periods of price
increases, from the date earnings fall below the desired minimum rate of return until
the date the commission enters its order allowing increased rates, the utility earns less
than a fair and reasonable rate of return. This delay entitles the utility to legal relief
but makes it impossible in some cases for law and equity to do complete justice. One
purpose of the fuel clause in electric rate schedules is to keep the mere lapse of time
from operating in favor of or against either the stockholders or the consumers. Id. at
35-36. See also note 79 and accompanying text infra.
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an adverse effect on earnings." Both the Utility Consumers Council
of Missouri" and the Office of the Public Counsel, 2 separate inter-
venors at the investigatory hearing, moved for a rehearing 13 which
the commission denied. 4 On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court
held that neither statutory nor case law authorized the commission to
extend the fuel adjustment clause to residential and small commer-
cial users.' 5
Public utilities have the right to collect a reasonable price for their
services. 6 The United States Supreme Court, in FederalPower Com-
mission v. Hope Natural Gas Co. ,1 held a proposed rate may be col-
10. 1976 Report & Order, supra note 6, at 4.
11. Utility Consumers Council of Missouri, Inc. (UCCM) is a non-profit corpora-
tion organized under the laws of the State of Missouri. State ex rel. Utility Consum-
ers Council v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 562 S.W.2d 688, 690 n.l (Mo. App. 1978).
12. The Omnibus State Reorganization Act created the Office of the Public Con-
sel (OPC). 1973 Mo. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. OPC is a segment of the Department of
Consumer Affairs, Regulation and Licensing. It represents the public before the com-
mission and has power to appeal commission decisions. Mo. REv. STAT. § 393.710
(1978). See also State ex rel. Missouri Power & Light Co. v. Riley, 546 S.W.2d 792,
796 (Mo. App. 1977); State ex rel. Utility Consumers Council v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 562 S.W.2d 688, 691 n.4 (Mo. App. 1978).
13. The motion was made pursuant to Mo. REv. STAT. § 386.500 (1978). UCCM
moved for the rehearing, alleging the fuel adjustment clause denied consumers their
due process rights, delegated the commission's regulatory duty, eliminated incentives
for companies to reduce costs, was unfair and confusing to consumers, could not be
policed adequately by the commission, did not exactly match the loss of revenues, and
would lead to company abuse. Intervenor-Utility Consumers Council of Mo. Mo-
tion for Rehearing, In re Investigation of the Fuel Adjustment Method, Case No.
17,730 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n April 26, 1976).
OPC charged that the commission failed to follow procedural requirements, did not
specifically instruct the utilities concerning how to implement the roll-in, engaged in
an illegal exercise of retroactive rate-making, and violated due process requirements.
Intervenor--Office of the Public Counsel Motion for Rehearing, In re Investigation of
the Fuel Adjustment Method, Case No. 17,730 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n May 3,
1976).
14. Pursuant to Mo. REv. STAT. § 386.510 (1978), separate appeals were taken to
the Circuit Court of Cole County, which affirmed the commission. State ex reL. Util-
ity Consumers Council v. Public Serv. Comm'n, No. 28594 (Cole County Cir. Ct.
May 31, 1977); Barvick v. Public Serv. Comm'n, No. 28604 (Cole County Cir. Ct.
May 31, 1977). Following appeal to the Kansas City Court of Appeals, the cases were
consolidated and transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court before opinion pursuant
to Mo. R. Civ. P. 83.06, Mo. CONST. art. V, § 10.
15. State ex rel. Utility Consumers Council v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 585 S.W.2d
41, 51 (Mo. 1979).
16. See C. PHILLIPS, supra note 1, at 80.
17. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
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lected if its effect is not unjust or unreasonable.' 8 Similarly, the
purpose of the Missouri Public Service Commission Act' 9 is to pro-
tect consumers against the natural monopoly of a public utility while
permitting a just and reasonable return.2" The Missouri Supreme
Court, in State ex rel Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co.
v. Public Service Commission,2 stated the legislature had delegated
plenary powers to the state public service commission.22 The legisla-
tive scheme provided that proper charges were those found by the
commission to be just and reasonable.23
18. Under the statutory authority of "just and reasonable" it is the result
reached and not the method employed which is controlling .... It is not theory
but the impact of the rate order that counts. If the total effect of the rate order
cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the Act is at
an end. The fact that the method employed to reach that result may contain
infirmities is not then important.
Id. at 602.
Rates must be just and reasonable both to investors and to customers. Id. at 605.
They must also be sufficient for the company to operate successfully, maintain its
financial integrity, attract capital, and compensate investors for risks assumed. Id. A
commission may employ any formula or combination of formulas it wishes and is free
to make pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular circumstances,
so long as they do not produce arbitrary or unreasonable consequences. Permian
Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 800 (1968). It must be free to devise "methods
of regulation capable of equitably reconciling diverse and conflicting interests." Id. at
767.
19. The Public Service Commission Act governs the regulation of utilities in Mis-
souri. Enacted in 1913, the Act is located in scattered sections of the Missouri Code.
Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 386.010-.710, 387.010, .350, 389.640, .980, 390.020, .170, 391.070,
392.190, 360, 393.110-.290 (1978 & Supp. 1980).
20. May Dep't Stores Co. v. Union Elec. Light & Power Co., 341 Mo. 299, 316,
107 S.W.2d 41, 48 (1937).
21. 312 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. 1958).
22. The commission is "a fact-finding body, exclusively entrusted and charged by
the legislature to deal with and determine the specialized problems arising out of the
operation of public utilities. It has a staff of technical and professional experts to aid
it in the accomplishment of its statutory powers." Id. at 796.
The Rock Island court found that the commission, a state agency, exercises the
police power of the state and the Public Service Commission Act should be liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes. Id. See also State ex rel. Kansas City
Transit, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 406 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. 1966).
23. Mo. REV. STAT. § 386.270 (1978). A company seeking a change in its rates
bears the burden of proving, by clear and satisfying evidence, that its present rates are
unreasonable. Mo. REV. STAT. § 386.430 (1978). The Public Service Commission
Act delegates discretion to the commission in determining the reasonableness of pres-
ent or proposed rates. Mo. REv. STAT. § 386.040. Judicial review of an order or
decision of the commission must be based on the record before the commission. Mo.
REV. STAT. § 386.510 (1978). The courts' role in review is limited to determining the
1980]
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There are two principal methods of determining just and reason-
able rates24 for utility companies: the "rate case" (or "complaint")
method 25 and the "file and suspend" method.26 The statutes require
a hearing in the former, but are optional, dependent upon the com-
mission's motion or the complaint of interested parties, in the latter
procedure.27 In addition to the principal methods, interim rate relief
is typically available upon a showing of emergency.28
The fuel adjustment clause, although used since 1917,29 was not
reasonableness and lawfulness of the order, Mo. REV. STAT. § 386.510 (1978); it can-
not substitute its discretion for that of the commission. State ex rel. Dyer v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 341 S.W.2d 795, 802 (Mo. 1960). Accord, State ex rel. Chicago, R. 1.
& Pac. R.R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 312 S.W.2d 791, 796 (Mo. 1958).
Orders of the commission must be upheld when supported by competent and sub-
stantial evidence in the record as a whole. State ex rel. Kansas City Transit, Inc. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 406 S.W.2d 5, 11 (Mo. 1966); State ex rel. Rice v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 359 Mo. 109, 114, 220 S.W.2d 61, 64 (Mo. 1949) (defining competent and
substantial evidence as "evidence which, if true, would have a probative force upon
the issues.").
24. For a brief description of the rate-making process, see City of Evansville v.
Southern Ind. Gas and Elec. Co., 167 Ind. App. 472, 339 N.E.2d 562 (1975); Com-
ment, The FuelAdjustment Clause and Its Role in the Regulatory Process, 47 Miss. L.J.
302, 304-05 (1976). See generally C. PHILLIPS, supra note 1, at chs. 8-11; A. PRIEST,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION chs. 3-5, 8, 11 (1969).
25. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 386.390, 393.260, 393.270 (1978).
26. Mo. REV. STAT. § 393.140(11) (1978). For a discussion of the two methods,
see State ex rel. Jackson County v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 532 S.W.2d 20, 23-27 (Mo.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 822 (1976); State ex rel. Laclede Gas Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 535 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. App. 1976).
27. State ex rel. Utility Consumers Council v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 585 S.W.2d
at 48.
28. State ex rel. Laclede Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 535 S.W.2d 561, 568
(Mo. App. 1976). See also Re Missouri Pub. Serv. Co., 28 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR)
109 (Mo. 1978), where interim relief was granted and "emergency" defined as a situa-
tion in which there exists a need for additional funds immediately, where the need
cannot be postponed and no other alternatives exist to meet the need but rate relief.
Id. at 111-14.
29. For a general history and overview of fuel adjustment clauses, see Foy, Cost
Adjustment in Utility Rate Schedules, 13 VAND. L. REV. 663 (1960); Trigg, Escalator
Clauses in Public Utility Rate Schedules, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 964 (1958); Comment,
The FuelAdjustment Clause and Its Role in the Regulatory Process, 47 Miss. L.J. 302
(1976). For discussion on regulation during inflationary periods, see ADAPTING REG-
ULATION TO SHORTAGES, CURTAILMENT AND INFLATION (J. O'Donnell ed. 1977).
Currently most states use some form of fuel clauses. See OVERSIGHT REPORT,
supra note 2, at 1. See also D. JONES & R. PROFOZICH, ELECTRICAL AND GAS UTIL-
ITY RATE AND FUEL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE INCREASES VIII (1977), prepared for SUB-
COMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY,
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND FEDERAL SERVICES OF THE SENATE COMM. ON Gov-
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extensively litigated until recently. The seminal case, City of Norfolk
Y. Virginia Electric and Power Co. ,3 held that rates are not merely
dollars-and-cents lists3 and that adjustment clauses fix them as
firmly as if they were stated in monetary terms.32 In 1961, 33 the Mis-
ERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (revised Dec. 21, 1978) [hereinafter cited as
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PRINT].
The Federal Power Commission has allowed fuel adjustment clauses since 1975.
Comment, The Fuel Adjustment Clause and Its Role in the Regulatory Process, 47
Miss. L.J. 302, 302 nn. 4 & 5 (1976). See generally Re Pennsylvania Power and Light
Co., 27 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 609 (FERC 1979) (application of Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (formerly Federal Power Commission) fuel clause); Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, § 208, 16 U.S.C. § 824d(f) (Supp. III 1979)
(requiring Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to ensure fuel clauses provide in-
centive for economical purchase and use of fuel); 18 C.F.R. § 35.14 (1979) (Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission regulations for fuel adjustment clauses). See also
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, §§ 113(b)(2), 115(e), 16 U.S.C.
§§ 2623(b)(2), 2625(e) (Supp. IlI 1979) (requiring state regulatory commissions to
consider whether fuel adjustment clauses provide incentive for economical purchase
and use of fuels when they approve such clauses).
Between 1970 and 1974, the number of utilities applying fuel adjustment clauses to
residential customers rose from 33% to 72%. During that same period, the number of
companies applying the clause to industrial customers increased from 72% to 83%.
Sarikas, What is New in Adjustment Clauses, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 19, 1975 at 33.
30. 197 Va. 505, 90 S.E.2d 140 (1955). Dealing with statutes substantially similar
to those of Missouri, the Virginia court placed the clause among "other schedules,
rate, rules or regulations that in any manner affect rates charged, .... " Id. at 516, 90
S.E.2d at 147. The court relied extensively upon the reasoning of Commissioner Cat-
terall one year earlier in the Lynchburg Gas Co. case, 6 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 33
(Va. 1954).
31. "Rate schedules consist not merely of lists of rates in dollars and cents, but
... include provisions that will in various ways affect the rates charged at the time of
the filing or to be charged thereafter." 197 Va. at 516, 90 S.E.2d at 148.
32. Id. The court went on to state that an adjustment clause:
is simply an addition of a mathematical formula to the filed schedules of the
company under which the rates and charges fluctuate as the wholesale cost of gas
to the company fluctuates. Hence, the resulting rates . . . are as firmly fixed
under the escalation clause as if they were stated in terms of money.
Id. Three years later the Illinois Supreme Court relied heavily on the Virginia opin-
ion in approving an adjustment clause. City of Chicago v. Illinois Com. Comm'n, 13
Ill. 2d 607, 150 N.E.2d 776 (1958).
The reasoning set forth in those two state supreme court cases in the 1950's has now
been adopted by courts of other states that have passed upon fuel adjustment clauses.
See City of El Dorado v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 235 Ark. 812, 362 S.W.2d 680 (1962);
Maestas v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 85 N.M. 571, 514 P.2d 847 (1973); City of San
Antonio v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 535 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
33. Despite gradually rising fuel prices in the 1950's and 1960's, technological ad-
vances, increased demand, and economies of scale lowered the price per kilowatt hour
of electricity, leading many utilities to file for rate decreases during that period.
19801
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sissippi Supreme Court, in United Gas Corp. v. Mississi4pi Public
Service Commission," found the state commission did have the au-
thority to approve an adjustment clause. Since the Federal Power
Commission regulated the gas supplier, the Mississippi court found
the utility had no control over the fuel price; therefore, the clause
would work to equitably protect both consumers and the company's
legitimate operating expenses.3 5
The North Carolina Supreme Court, following the City of Norfolk
analysis, affirmed its commission's authorization of a fuel clause in
State ex rel Utility Commission v. Edmisten.36 The court said the
clause recognized the reality of the market place37 and prevented
continual rate cases on the sole issue of fuel increases.38 Wisconsin's
Supreme Court approved the principle of a fuel adjustment clause in
Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Public Service Commis-
sion. The court stated, however, that limiting the scope of the
clause would reduce any threat to the regulatory hearing process.40
Only ten states totally or partially reject the use of fuel adjustment
clauses.41 Arizona, a state which specifically authorized the clause,42
Schiffel, Electric Utility Regulation: An Overview of Fuel Adj4ustment Clauses, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., June 19, 1975, at 24.
34. 240 Miss. 405, 127 So. 2d 404 (1961).
35. 240 Miss. at 440-41, 127 So. 2d at 421-22. Federal regulation also played a
part in the decision in City of Akron v. Public Util. Comm'n, 5 Ohio St. 2d 237, 215
N.E.2d 366 (1966), and Public Serv. Co. v. State, 113 N.H. 497, 311 A.2d 513 (1973).
36. 291 N.C. 327, 230 S.E.2d 651 (1976). The court rejected an argument that the
clause considered one expense item to the exclusion of others because the commission
approved the clause in the course of a regular rate case. Id. at 340, 230 S.E.2d at 659.
The court dismissed an argument of abdication of delegated powers because of the
statute authorizing the commission to suspend any rate at any time, the continuing
surveillance programs and the two-year limit on the clause. Id. at 344, 230 S.E.2d at
662. The Missouri clause contained similar safeguards. See notes 74-75 infra.
37. Id. at 346-47, 230 S.E.2d at 663. Accord, Montana Consumer Council v. Pub-
lic Serv. Comm'n, 168 Mont. 180, 189, 541 P.2d 770, 775 (1975).
38. 291 N.C. at 347-48, 230 S.E.2d at 663. See Consumer Org. for Fair Energy
Equality, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Util., 368 Mass. 599, 606, 335 N.E.2d 341, 345
(1975).
39. 81 Wis. 2d 344, 260 N.W.2d 712 (1978).
40. Id. at 351-52, 260 N.W.2d at 716.
41. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PRINT, supra note 29, at IX. Idaho, Oregon, Nevada,
Washington, and Utah are listed as having neither gas nor electric fuel clauses. Colo-
rado and Kansas only have electric utility fuel clauses. Id. Montana is listed as hav-
ing neither, yet the Montana Supreme Court upheld a gas adjustment clause as
recently as 1975. See Montana Consumer Council v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 168
Mont. 180, 541 P.2d 770 (1975). West Virginia's legislature banned the clause in 1975
[Vol. 20:229
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repealed the statute to provide an incentive to utilities to seek lower
fuel costs.43 Some Pacific Northwestern states" have neither gas nor
and Arizona's legislature repealed the statute relied upon as authority for the clause
in mid-August 1978. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PRINT, supra note 29, at IX. While the
validity of fuel clauses was being litigated in North Carolina, see State ex rel. Utilities
Comm'n v. Edmisten, 291 N.C. 327, 230 S.E.2d 651 (1976), the North Carolina legis-
lature passed a statute terminating the use of any clause as of September 1, 1975. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-134(e) (Supp. 1977).
Arguments against fuel adjustment clauses can be broken into three major catego-
ries: economic, legal and practical. The economic arguments include a universal de-
sire to pay as little as possible for any service; fluctuating prices tend to confuse
consumers and the utilities lose incentive to curb energy expenses. The legal argu-
ment centers around the regulatory process. Critics charge that fuel adjustment
clauses prevent adequate supervision of utility rates or the rate structure (abdication
of regulatory duty), permit rate increases without consideration of ali relevant rate-
making factors, and shift the burden of proof of reasonableness from the utility to the
commission. The practical argument urges that utility rates should be stable, pub-
lished and definite so the typical consumer can understand and react to them. Trigg,
supra note 2, at 968-72. The author refutes each of these arguments as presented. Id.
A number of states have taken pains to ensure against due process problems. See
Re Allied Power and Light Co., 132 Vt. 365, 321 A.2d 7 (1974) (commission order as
filed violated statute, but capable of remedy by filing rate changes under statute call-
ing for public notice); Re Public Serv. Co., 13 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) I (Colo. 1975)
(order monthly review of following month's fuel cost adjustment); Re Sierra Pac.
Power Co., 2 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 46 (Nev. 1973) (could increase rates through
clause only once every six months and only after hearing).
Missouri has held proper changes in electric rates are not subject to a due process
attack. State ex rel. Jackson County v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 332 S.W.2d 20 (Mo.
1976). Accord, Consumer's Org. for Fair Energy Equality, Inc. v. Department of Pub.
Util., 368 Mass. 599, 335 N.E.2d 341 (1975) (fluctuations under the fuel adjustment
clause are not changes in the rate schedule which would require a public hearing);
Village of Saugerties v. Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp., Opinion 75-5, Case No.
26756, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n (March 21, 1975) (change due to the fuel adjustment
clause was not a change in the rates of public utilities subject to hearing require-
ments).
See generally Note, Due Process Restraints on the Use of Automatic Adjustment
Clauses in Electric Rate Schedules, 11 ARIz. L. REV. 453 (1976); Note, Due Process
and the Automatic Fuel Adjustment Clause, 52 IND. L.J. 637 (1977).
Arguments against the clause before the Missouri Public Service Commission fell
into the categories Trigg outlined. 1974 Report & Order, supra note 6, at 5-6. The
report also summarized the arguments in favor of the clause. 1976 Report & Order,
supra note 6, at 4-5. Arguments specific to Missouri, brought out during the 1976
hearing, included questions as to whether or not fuel costs had stabilized, whether the
utilities could foresee and prepare for environmental regulations which would neces-
sitate the use of more expensive fuel and whether the clause would actually reduce the
frequency of rate cases. Id. at 5-6.
42. Trigg, supra note 2, at 968 n. 12.
43. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PRINT, supra note 29, at X.
44. Idaho, Montana, Oregon and Washington. Id. at IX.
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electric fuel clauses, as the prevalence of hydroelectric generation
greatly reduces the need for fuel.45
The Missouri Supreme Court in State ex rel Hotel Continental v.
Burton46 held the commission could authorize a utility's use of a tax
adjustment clause 47 to collect locally imposed taxes.4 s The court
characterized the clause as a rule or regulation relating to a rate.49
One item of operating expense, the gross receipts tax, was different in
kind5" and could be treated separately from other expense items.51
The tax, levied by the city, was not an item within the utility's con-
trol, yet payment was required. 2 As the tax was based on the charge
to the customer, it was directly assignable to consumers in proportion
to their use. 3 Economy of operation and management decisions
could not affect tax revenues,54 nor would tax increases or decreases
affect the rate of return.55
In State ex ret Utility Consumers Council v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 6 the Missouri Supreme Court became the first to reject a fuel
adjustment clause on the ground that the public service commission
45. See Trigg, supra note 2, at 968.
46. 334 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 1960).
47. The company wished to add, as a separate item on each customer's bill, a
surcharge "equal to the proportionate part" of a tax based on the gross receipts, net
receipts or revenues from service to the customers. Id. at 77.
48. All the utility's steam customers were within a seven-block-square area of
Kansas City. All customers were thus within the taxing jurisdiction. Id. at 80.
49. Missouri law specifically empowered the commission to hold a hearing and
determine the propriety of any "new rule, regulation or practice relating to any rate."
Mo. REv. STAT. § 393.150 (1949). The tax clause was held to be within the provisions
of the statute. 334 S.W.2d at 80.
50. 334 S.W.2d at 81-82.
51. The express power to determine just and reasonable rates that protect the pub-
lic and a utility's rate of return includes the power to "authorize a utility as an integral
part of its rate schedule to deal with an item of operating expense in a different man-
ner than other such items as a part of a pattern or design to accomplish a just and
reasonable total charge to the public. . ." Id. at 79.
52. Id. at 82-83. The Hotel Continental court dismissed the argument that an au-
tomatic adjustment charge was an abdication of the commission's regulatory duties
by saying "[t]he city by changing the gross receipts tax no more exercises rate making
power than does the supplier of coal who raises the price per ton." Id. at 83.
53. Id. at 80.
54. Id. at 82.
55. Id.
56. 585 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1979).
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did not have the power to add such a clause to rate schedules.5 7 The
court was satisfied that the factual differences between the tax clause
in Hotel Continental and the fuel clause at issue in Utility Consumers
Council sufficiently distinguished the cases. The court found that
since the fuel adjustment charge was based on estimated sales it was
not directly assignable.58 The cost of fuel burned depended on man-
agement choices as to the fuel and generation facility used and on
management's negotiating skills.59 Savings in other areas of opera-
tion coupled with fuel cost recovery affected the rate of return
earned.6' The fuel component, though much larger, was not different
in kind from most other operating expenses; the court thus implied
that if automatic adjustment were applied to fuel, it could extend
equally to labor, supplies and construction.6" The court therefore re-
fused to extend the Hotel Continental rationale to fuel adjustment
clauses. 62
The commission's reliance on a statute authorizing "sliding
scales,"163 while on its face appropriate, proved fatal. Previous con-
struction of the statute' defined a sliding scale as a tying of prear-
57. The court in State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Edmisten, 291 N.C. 327, 230
S.E.2d 651 (1976), found no cases disapproving the use of the clause in principle. The
states that have recently disapproved the clause have done so either through the legis-
lature or commission. See notes 41-45 supra.
58. State ex rel. Utility Consumers Council v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 585 S.W.2d
at 53.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 54.
61. Id,
62. Id.
63. Nothing in this section shall be taken to prohibit [an]. . .electrical corpo-
ration. . . from establishing a sliding scale for a fixed period for the automatic
adjustment of charges for. . . electricity. . . rendered or to be rendered and the
dividends to be paid stockholders of such . . . electrical corporation . . .; pro-
vided, that the sliding scale shall first have been filed with and approved by the
commission; but nothing in this subdivision shall operate to prevent the commis-
sion after the expiration of such fixed period from fixing proper, just and reason-
able rates and charges to be made for service authorized in this chapter.
Mo. Rev. STAT. § 393.130(4) (1978).
The commission buttressed its argument by reliance on the general powers granted
m Mo. REV. STAT. § 393.130(1) (1978) which states "[a]ll charges made or demanded
by any. . electrical corporation. . . for. . . electricity. . . rendered or to be ren-
dered shall be just and reasonable and not more than allowed by law or by order or
decision of the commission."
64. Bertha A. Mining Co. v. Empire Dist. Elec. Co., 210 Mo. App. 62, 235 S.W.
508 (1921).
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ranged inverse changes in stockholder dividends to a change in rates
charged. 5 By permitting66 and reenacting67 the one exception to a
fixed rate schedule, the legislature was presumed to have intended no
other variable rates. Nor did the Missouri statutes, taken as a whole,
convince the court that the commission could authorize a fuel adjust-
ment clause.6 8 Despite the plenary nature of the powers granted the
commission by the legislature, the court found the commission had
only explicit or clearly implied discretion.69
At its broadest reading, Utility Consumers Council prohibits use of
a fuel adjustment clause entirely, but the narrower interpretation,
that the commission erred in approving this fuel adjustment clause, is
preferable. 70 The rate case is the preferred method of adjusting
65. The Bertha court quoted with approval from Re Boston Consol. Gas Co.,
1919A PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 699 (Mass.):
The essential characteristic of this method of regulating the price of gas is by a
prearranged automatic and interdependent adjustment of the price to consumers
and the rate of dividends to stockholders, whereby for every decrease or increase
in the price the stockholders are permitted an increase or suffer a decrease in the
rate of dividend.
210 Mo. App. at 629,235 S.W. at 511. Seealso 2 0. POND, LAW OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
§ 573 (4th ed. 1932).
66. "By permitting an exception to the fixed rate system in the case of the sliding
scale, the legislature by implication, intended no other exceptions exist." State ex rel.
Utility Consumers Council v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 585 S.W.2d at 55, and cases cited
therein.
67. "The legislature has reenacted the provision construed in Bertha 4. Mining
Co., and we must presume it thus concurred in the interpretation of 'sliding scale' set
out therein." Id.
68. The court said the legislature mandated a fixed rate schedule, with only one
exception. Id. at 55-56. See note 66 supra. Calling the first clause a "rule relating to
a rate" would exalt form over substance as the effect of the clause was increased bills.
Id. at 57. The clause was "effectively" an abdication of the commission's powers,
would negate the requirement that rates be printed, and would lead the court down a
"slippery slope," with the risk of dismantling the carefully balanced fixed rate system
established by the legislature. Id. at 24-26.
69. State exrel. City of West Plains v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 310 S.W.2d 925, 928
(Mo. 1958). Neither convenience, expediency or necessity are proper matters for con-
sideration in the determination of whether or not an act of the commission is author-
ized by statute. State ex rel. Kansas City v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 301 Mo. 179, 180,
257 S.W. 462, 462 (1923).
70. If a fuel adjustment clause were proposed in the future, it would have to meet
certain requirements as to assignability, lack of control, separation from other ex-
pense items and retained commission authority to overcome the hurdles of both this
case and State ex rel. Hotel Continental v. Burton, 334 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 1960).
The commission's jurisdiction and rule-making power expires November 30, 1981,
Mo. REv. STAT. § 386.250 (1978). If the legislature reenacts the act without comment,
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rates7' because all relevant factors are considered.72 If a utility
presented a clause as just another tariff during a rate case,7 3 the argu-
ment that a hearing is required on all relevant factors would be met.
The commission included safeguards in the clause.74 So long as
a future petitioner will need to prove the legislature did not approve of this decision
by its action. See note 67 supra. In a concurring opinion, one judge felt the decision
was proper, but regrettable, and urged the legislature to address the problem. 585
S.W.2d at 60 (Rendlen, J., concurring).
71. See State ex rel. Laclede Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 535 S.W.2d 561
(Mo. App. 1976). The court emphasized the desirability of leaving the whole question
of just and reasonable rates "to the permanent rate proceeding in which all the facts
can be developed more deliberately with full opportunity for an auditing of financial
figures and a mature consideration by the commission of all factors and all interests."
Id. at 574. See also Re Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 23 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 362
(Cal. 1977) (while desirable to consider major rate change in context of a general rate
increase proceeding, nothing precludes a commission from considering a rate design
change in an offset matter where there was a serious need for such change).
72. See State ex rel. Hotel Continental v. Burton, 334 S.W.2d 75, 81 (Mo. 1960)
(tax clause would prevent rate cases "for the sole purpose" of reflecting each change);
State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Edmisten, 291 N.C. 327, 230 S.E.2d 651 (1976)
(clause is only a rider to general rate schedule; all elements, including the rider, were
considered); Re Potomac Elec. Power Co., 85 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 119 (Md. 1970)
(clause saves cost of rate cases); Re Burlington Elec. Light Dep't, 95 PUB. U. REP. 3d
(PUR) 273 (Vt. 1972) (approved clause to avoid needless rounds of rate cases). But
see Note, Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1977, 56 N.C. L. Rv. 843
(1978). After the North Carolina legislature specifically outlawed fuel adjustment
clauses, during the Edmrten litigation, it was contemplated that companies would
recover for later increases in fuel costs by seeking a general rate case in lieu of sepa-
rate monthly additional fuel charges. Id. at 847.
73. The fuel clause in this case was an industry-wide rule applicable to all electric
utilities resulting from an investigation hearing. 1976 Report and Order, supra note 6,
at 30. Application during a rate case would permit the commission to specifically
tailor a model clause to each company. See State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Edmis-
ten, 291 N.C. 327, 230 S.E.2d 651 (1976).
74. Ten guidelines for safeguards were presented in Schiffel, Electric Utility Regu-
lation An Overview of FuelAdjsftment Clauses, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 19, 1975, at
29. He recommends that utility companies be required to document their search for
fuel supplied and their negotiations with fuel suppliers and that they certify the quali-
ty of delivered fuel. Commissions should compare reported fuel costs to the Federal
Power Commission area averages for the relevant area and with other utilities within
the jurisdiction. Discrepancies greater than 10% above the average should bejustified
in writing. Commissions should also monitor utilities to ensure they use their most
efficient generating equipment, build new low-cost-fuel generating facilities, and
maintain their facilities so they operate at peak efficiency. Random spot audits
should be conducted. The clause would only apply to the raw fuel cost and not to
transport, storage or handling. The clause should include a two-month lag to keep
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the statutes allow the commission to suspend rates at any time7" and
the commission monitors and reviews performance under the
clause,76 abdication is not an issue.77 A more precise formula7 s
would eliminate the problem of assigning costs directly to the con-
sumer whose use required the cost and would stimulate utility effi-
ciency through regulatory lag.79 If fuel adjustment revenues are
some financial pressure on the utilities. Above all, each safeguard should be known
to the public and the verifications open to public inspection.
The Missouri fuel clause included a provision for audits, refunds of 106% of any
overcharges, review of fuel contracts and a two-month lag. See 1976 Report & Order,
supra note 6, at 18 and appendices.
75. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 393.140(5), .150, .270(2) (1978).
76. See note 74 supra.
77. State exrel. Utilities Comm'n v. Edmisten, 291 N.C. 327, 344, 230 S.E.2d 651,
662 (1976). See also Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 20 Cal.3d 813.
576 P.2d 945, 144 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1978) (commission decision to refund fuel clause
overcollections was not retroactive rate-making as the clause was not intended to
yield gain to the company); Application of Kauai Elec. Div. of Citizen's Util. Co., 60
Haw. 166, 590 P.2d 524 (1978) (should rate schedule, including "energy" clause, be-
come unjust, consumers have recourse to complain to the commission or consumer
advocate); Capital Improvement Bd. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 375 N.E.2d 616 (Ind.
App. 1978) (fuel clause not delegation of commission's authority as all procedural
requirements for approving a rate change were met).
78. See, e.g., North Carolina's fuel clause. 291 N.C. at 331, 230 S.E.2d at 654.
With the same lag period as Missouri's clause, North Carolina utilities used actual
expenses and actual sales to determine the charge. Simplified, the fuel adjustment
factor equaled:
(actual cost of fuel burned two months ago-base price cost of same fuel)
total kilowatt hour sales two months ago
which was then added to the base price for the current month's bill. 291 N.C. at 331-
32, 230 S.E.2d at 654.
Greatly simplified, Missouri's fuel adjustment factor equaled:
(actual cost of allowable fuels burned two months ago-base price cost of same fuel)
estimated kilowatt hour sales for the billing month
added to the base price bill. 1976 Report & Order, supra note 6, at Appendix A.
Basing the adjustment on actual figures means the utility charged each customer a
fuel factor only for his proportion of the costs of fuel burned, coming within the
exactness test of State ex rel. Hotel Continental v. Burton, 334 S.W.2d at 82. See also
Ohio Power Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 54 Ohio St. 2d 342, 376 N.E.2d 1337 (1978)
(fuel clause could pass through expenses for fuel costs fairly attributable to the service
provided); Re Kentucky Util. Co., 95 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 372 (Ky. 1972) (clause
allowed where fuel costs certain to occur, product involved would be entirely con-
sumed and increased costs subject to exact determination).
79. See generally J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES (1961).
Boabright defined regulatory lag as "the quite usual time delay between the time
when reported rates of profit are above or below standard and the time when an
offsetting rate decrease or increase may be put into effect by commission order or
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restricted to actual costs, then the authorized rate of return is not af-
fected." The commission has long had authority to grant interim test
or experimental rates."' If the inflation rate were to accelerate
again, 2 a fuel adjustment clause, with appropriate safeguards, might
be reinstated as an interim rate. 3
The court stated the legislature, and not the court, should strike an
appropriate balance between public participation and simplicity in
rate proceedings. 4 The court glossed over the fact that the legisla-
otherwise." Id. at 53. The lag, a commission-fixed "fair rate of return," and no guar-
antee of the return, combine to promote efficiency in the utility. Id See also Sarikas,
What is New in Adjustment Clauses, PUB. UTIL. FORT. June 19, 1975 at 34, stating lag
provides incentive because the utility must cover the expense, even if it is later reim-
bursed, and could lose money; Oversight Hearings, supra note 4, at 5 (testimony of
Ralph H. Wickberg).
80. See State ex rel. Hotel Continental v. Burton, 334 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 1960). The
exact increase in revenues equaled the exact tax liability so the utility's rate of return
was not affected. Id. at 81-82. See also Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 20 Cal.3d 813, 576 P.2d 945, 144 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1978) (refund of fuel ad-
justment clause overcollections approved even through company did not exceed the
authorized rate of return because extra profits contradicted the utilities' claims of the
clause's neutral effects); Public Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 96 PUB. U.
REP. 3d (PUR) 113 (Pa. 1973).
Utilities are allowed to retain earnings because of company efficiency in one area of
operation when the commission overestimates the base rates. State ex rel. Utilities
Comm'n v. Edmisten, 291 N.C. 327, 341, 230 S.E.2d 651, 660 (1976), and cases cited
therein. Rate-making is prospective and therefore estimated. Utilities are allowed to
retain revenues even if they increase the rate of return, but are subject to rate reduc-
tions at the next rate case. Id. at 341-42, 230 S.E.2d at 660.
Because of its size in the operating budget and its unpredictable future, the fuel
component is a proper item to "deregulate." Given the choice of estimating fuel costs
for the future without certainty or using a fuel adjustment clause, the North Carolina
commissioners opted for the latter, thus preventing another rate case on the same
issue almost immediately, yet denying excess profit to the utility. Id. at 342, 230
S.E.2d at 661.
81. State ex rel. Laclede Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 535 S.W.2d 561,567 n.
I (Mo. App. 1976) and cases cited therein.
82. At least two commissions have approved fuel adjustment clauses with a "trig-
gering" mechanism. See, e.g., City of Evansville v. Southern Ind. Gas and Elec. Co.,
167 Ind. App. 472, 339 N.E.2d 562 (1975) (formula requires demonstration of fixed
minimum fluctuation for fixed minimum period prior to revision); Re Florida Power
Corp., 73 PuB. U. REp. 3d (PUR) 295 (Fla. 1968) (clause is inactive during normal
conditions, but activated when there is a major and sustained change in fuel costs).
83. The two-year limit placed on both the 1974 and the 1976 orders followed by a
review period suggests the commission may have been experimenting with the rate.
See 1976 Report & Order, supra note 6, at 19; 1974 Report & Order, supra note 6, at
16.
84. 585 S.W.2d at 54.
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ture created an agency to amass the requisite expertise to determine
such questions.8 5 The legislature vested the commission with the
power and discretion to carry out its decisions. In light of there being
no positive prohibition against the clause, no abdication of the com-
mission's power to change its policy in the future,8 6 and no infringe-
ment of citizen's rights87 the decision to approve the clause should
stand.
The era of cheap energy is behind us.88 Whether the rate hike
comes in a rate case, with all its attendant cost8 9 and delay, or
through a fuel adjustment clause, customers' bills will still reflect
higher energy prices.90 After the court struck the fuel adjustment
clause, electric utilities immediately applied for increases.9 Legisla-
tive action or interim rate proceedings may prove too slow to provide
future relief92 since utilities cannot absorb rapid increases in fuel
costs without impairing their ability to provide adequate service at
85. State ex rel. Chicago, R. I. and Pac. R.R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 312
S.W.2d 791, 796 (Mo. 1958).
86. The statutes for commission review still exist-and the commission prescribed a
number of monitoring provisions in the 1976 Report & Order. See 1976 Report &
Order, supra note 6, at 18. See also note 74 supra.
87. State ex rel. Jackson County v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 532 S.W.2d 20 (Mo.
1976).
88. Cockrell, Coal Conversion by Electric Utilities: Reconciling Energy Indepen-
dence and Environmental Protection, 28 HAST. L.J. 1245, 1269 (1977). See also OVER-
SIGHT REPORT, supra note 2, at 33. "The fact that energy costs have risen and must
be paid cannot be wished away." 120 CONG. REC. 40776 (1974) (insertion by Sen.
Metcalf).
89. Expenses incurred by the utility company during a rate case are passed on to
the consumer. Commissions allow the inclusion of the expense in the rate base and
amortization of the expense over a period of time. See, e.g., Re Gas Serv. Co., 6 PUB.
U. REP. 4th (PUR) 99 (Mo. 1974) (gas company expenses ordered amortized over
three years); Re Capital City Water Co., 100 PUn. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 124 (Mo. 1973)
(water company expenses, three years); Re Valley Sewage Co., 89 PUB. U. REP. 3d
(PUR) 321 (Mo. 1971) (four years); Re Kansas City Power & Light Co., 84 PUB. U.
REP. 3d (PUR) 222 (Mo. 1970) (five years).
90. Residential electrical purchases accounted for only two percent of personal
consumption expenses in 1974. See OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 2, at 35.
91. Intervenor-Appellant's Suggestions in Opposition to Motion for Rehearing
Filed by Intervenor-Respondent-Electric Utilities at 15, State ex rel. Utility Consum-
ers Council v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 585 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1979), rehearing denied,
Sept. 11, 1979. One application was filed before the motion for rehearing was fully
briefed. Id.
92. See note 9 supra.
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reasonable prices.9 3 If energy prices were falling, consumers would
clamor for immediate relief in the form of decreased rates. In times
of rising prices, consumers face the prospect of drastically reduced
service or no service at all94 if utility companies are not provided
adequate financial resources. The clause is fair to both consumers
and utilities and furthers the intent of the regulatory statutes. The
principle of fuel adjustment clauses should be affirmed.
Douglass W. Dewing
93. State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Edmisten, 291 N.C. 327, 333, 230 S.E.2d
651, 655 (1978).
94. See Oversight Hearings, swpra note 4, at 347 (testimony of Sylvia Siegel). Ms.
Siegel, while not advocating the policy, thought denial of electricity or brownouts on
a "selected sequential basis for an hour or two each day" might be preferable to pay-
ing "the exorbitant charges" of the electric companies. Id.
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